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Usually the benefits and burdens of property ownership belong to the
same person. In a trust, however, the two are separate. All the benefits
belong to one party (the beneficiary) and all the burdens belong to another
party (the trustee).1 Under modern law, three legal entities - a settlor, a
beneficiary, and a trustee - are necessary in order to create a trust.2 To
• Professor of Law, Cornell University School of Law. I am indebted to my colleague Greg
Alexander for extremely constructive comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at a conference on trust relationships jointly sponsored by the Liberty Fund and the Politi-
cal Economy Research Center. The comments of Terry Anderson, Peter Aranson, Stephen Cornell,
Dean Leuck, Roger Meiners, Laura Nelson, Kim Ohnemus, Richard Stroup, and Stephen Williams
are also much appreciated.
1 Keplinger v. Keplinger, 185 Ind. 81, 113 N.E. 292 (1916) (a trust is defined as a property
right held by one party for the use or benefit of another).
Modern trusts are traceable to the feudal concerns of medieval England. Under the feudal system,
someone in possession of land held it as a grant from his lord. The lord granted his land away to
obtain certain benefits, called duties, that the possessor, or tenant, of the land would owe to him. The
most costly of these duties fell due at the tenant's death when the land would pass to his heir.
The landholders developed a system to keep their land in their families, but avoid the duties that
fell due at inheritance. They deeded their land to two or more other persons, but in the deed reserved
the use of the land for themselves. When one of the persons the land was deeded to died, he would be
replaced by someone else. Thus the land never passed to an heir and the feudal incidents never
became due.
In time, most of the land in England came to be held this way. This system had many side benefits
for the tenantsj their creditors could not reach the land, since the legal title was in other people, and
the medieval law requiring forfeiture of land upon a criminal act was avoided. Also, in early medieval
times, land could not be sold or willed away; it had to pass to the tenant's legal heir. However, the use
of the land, which is all the tenant retained, could be willed to whomever he wished.
This dividing up of the ownership of land into legal title and use greatly weakened the power of the
overlords, especially the king. As a result, in 1535, Henry VIII forced the Statute of Uses through an
unwilling Parliament. The statute was intended to turn the legal title in land over to those who had
the use of the land, and to do away with dual ownership.
The statute, however, had many loopholes, which were exploited by the land holders and embraced
by the courts. The most significant of those loopholes were that only realty was included under the
statute, not personalty, and only those trusts which imposed no duty on the legal owner to actively use
the property for the benefit of the use holder were included. Modern trusts sprang from these excep-
tions. See G. KEETON & L. SHERIDAN, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 18-32 (10th ed. 1974); 1 A. Soon &
W. FRATCHER, Soon ON TRUSTS: THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 1.2-1.7 (1987).
• The creation of a trust vests legal title to property in the trustee and equitable (or beneficial)
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create a trust, the settlor transfers his title in the trust property to the
trustee who holds the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.
This Article employs an economic perspective to evaluate the creation of
private trusts by private individuals. At first blush, private trusts appear
to be simply another means by which private property owners may make
use of their assets. As such, the private creation of private trusts seems to
be a rather uninteresting topic for the application of economic analysis. In
fact, however, the common law, which is generally considered to move
towards efficient resolution of legal disputes, places significant constraints
on the ability of property owners to alienate their property by means of
the trust relation.
It is the thesis of this Article that the byzantine array of common law
trust doctrines, which purport to modify trusts to conform to changing
circumstances in ways the courts believe the settlor would have done if he
possessed the requisite information to make an informed choice, do not
promote efficiency and increase societal wealth. In this regard, the Article
is at odds with the conventional wisdom in the law and economics litera-
ture, particularly as articulated by Judge Richard Posner, which holds
that the common law in general and the law of trusts in particular tend
toward efficiency.S
This Article departs from the conventional wisdom in two respects.
First, it posits that the harmony between efficiency concerns and outcomes
title in the beneficiary. This separation of the legal and equitable aspects of property ownership is the
hallmark of a trust relationship. As such, when a settlor creates a trust he transfers all of his property
rights to two distinct legal entities; the trustee, who is obliged to use his legal rights to the property for
the benefit of the beneficiary, and the beneficiary, who receives the benefits of the property, as speci-
fied by the settlor.
The settlor and the trustee may be the same person. In such cases, the settlor, in creating the trust,
alters his legal relationship with the property that is the subject of the trust so as to obligate himselr to
transfer some or all or the benefits of the property to the beneficiary.
In addition, the settlor and the beneficiary may be the same person. In such cases, the property
owner declares that, from the moment of the creation of the trust, legal title to the property is trans-
ferred to a second party who holds the property for the benefit of the transferor.
While the settlor and the beneficiary may be the same person, and the settlor and the trustee may
be the same person, the sole beneficiary of a trust may not be the sole trustee. If someone has legal
title to property and also enjoys the equitable, or beneficial rights, the two aspects or property owner-
ship have not been separated, and thus a trust relationship has not been created. G. KEETON & L.
SHERIDAN, supra note 1, at 47-54.
3 See R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29-30, 481-85 (3d ed. 1986).
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generated by courts applying the common law of trusts is generally over-
stated. Second, and by way of explanation, it argues that particular as-
pects of the trust relation cause the common law system to depart from the
conventional efficiency model in ways that previously have gone
unrecognized.
The first part of this Article explores the nature of the economic
problems that lead the legal system to impose constraints on the ability to
create trust relationships. The following sections examine particular as-
pects of the law of trusts against the analytic framework devised in Section
II. From an economic perspective, the failure of the legal system to regu-
late certain aspects of the trust relation (particularly the charitable foun-
dation) is as interesting as its insistence on regulating certain other aspects
of that relation. The final section of the Article offers an analysis of the
private trust from the perspective of the modern theory of the firm.
II. AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE LAW
CONCERNING THE PRIVATE CREATION OF PRIVATE TRUSTS
From the standpoint of economic efficiency, the legal right to create
private trusts that permit dead hand control of wealth appears to cause a
dilemma.4 On the one hand, the legal right to dictate through a trust how
wealth is to be used after death may lead to economic inefficiency because
conditions inevitably will change in ways unforeseeable to the settlor. On
the other hand, regulating how a settlor can dispose of his wealth may
lead to inefficiencies because such interference would decrease the incen-
tive to accumulate wealth, since influencing events and individuals after
one's death may provide a primary motivation for accumulating wealth
during one's life.1I
• The dead hand control of wealth refers to those legal rights that permit property owners to
dictate through a trust how wealth is to be used after their death.
• This appears fairly obvious when one stops to consider the fact that most people of means die
without consuming all of their wealth during their lifetimes. If people derived no utility from the
prospect of influencing events after their death, then it is improbable that they Vlould die while still in
possession of significant economic resources.
And, as Judge Posner has observed, the argument that the reason people die leaving significant
resources cannot persuasively be answered by the argument that people do not know when they are
going to die. The ability to purchase financial instruments such as annuities means that property
holders can, if they so choose, be assured of dying without leaving a significant estate at death. See R.
POSNER, supra note 3, at 479-80.
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Judge Posner, after noting the existence of this apparent conflict, dis-
misses it as a false dilemma.6 He argues that, in many cases, rigid adher-
ence to the settlor's terms actually would frustrate his intentions, under
the assumption that the settlor did not intend to make a useless gift. While
this assumption appears uncontroversial, indeed banal, it begs the more
important theoretical questions associated with the private creation of pri-
vate trusts.
Perhaps the most obvious question is whether the initial premise, that
conditions often change in ways unforeseeable by the settlor, is necessarily
correct. Put another way, the question becomes whether the transaction
costs of writing a trust instrument that specifies all conceivable future con-
tingencies are truly infinite. Even if the answer to the question is yes, it is
interesting to wonder: at what point does it become inefficient to plan for
the unexpected? This Article argues that this must depend on how the
settlor expects the unexpected to be handled.
The next question is the extent to which the possibility of a settlor's
error creates an additional justification for regulating the ways that a set-
tlor can dispose of his wealth.? That issue is related to the previous issue
in the following way: even if a settlor can increase the probability of
achieving his wishes by specifying such wishes in great detail, he will
refrain from doing so if the gain is offset by the losses that come in the
form of increased error costs.
The final question, and perhaps the most complicated issue embedded
in an analysis of how to create the optimal system for the creation of
private trusts, is how to monitor and control those people involved in the
disposition of the trust after it is created. This issue is closely analogous to
the problems in corporate finance associated with the separation of owner-
ship and management of the large, public corporation. The problem, how-
ever, appears to be significantly more acute in the context of the trust
relation - and in the context of the charitable foundation in particular -
as the market forces that constrain the scope of authority of corporate
officials do not appear to constrain similarly the trustees and employees of
6 R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 481-83.
? See generally Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interaction
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAUF. L. REV. 261, 265-73 (1985) (discussing the
various sorts of errors that can occur in formulating contracts, including administrative error, ambigu-
ity, incompleteness, inconsistency, and misinterpretation).





The questions described above can be summarized as follows: (1) what
is the nature of the transaction costs associated with the creation of private
trusts; (2) what are the error costs associated with the private creation of
private trusts; and (3) what are the agency costs associated with the pri-
vate creation of private trusts?
A simple example demonstrates that the analysis concerns broader is-
sues about economic efficiency and overall societal welfare. Suppose a tes-
tator with $40,000,000 has decided that he will derive 100 units of utility
from organizing a charitable trust that will establish a fund to sponsor
conferences on the general subject of liberty in society. Our testator also
has decided that he would derive 95 units of utility from declining to es-
tablish a trust and instead making an outright gift of his money to the
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra. The testator will not automatically
choose to give his money to the charitable trust. Rather, his decision about
how to allocate his money will depend on the probability that the fund
ultimately will in fact sponsor conferences on the general subject of liberty
in society.8 If there is a one-hundred percent probability that the gift to
the Symphony will be used as the benefactor prefers, and a probability of
any sum less than 95% that the bequest, for any of the reasons described
above, will be used to sponsor seminars that deal with the subject of lib-
erty, then the benefactor will prefer that his money go to the Symphony.
Thus, overall societal welfare can be improved by erecting a legal sys-
tem that lowers the error, transaction, and agency costs associated with
creating private trusts. Such a legal system would provide maximum in-
centives to create wealth, and facilitate the creation of private trusts which
provide for the creation of significant public goods. The remainder of this
Article reviews the major legal rules that concern the private creation of
private trusts and analyzes them on the basis of whether they serve to
reduce the costs associated with the creation of trusts in ways suggested by
the model described above.
• See generally Bernheim, Shleifer & Summers, The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON.
1045 (t985) (an analysis of the use of bequests by testators to influence the behavior of potential
beneficiaries).
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III. THE COMMON LAW OF TRUSTS
A. The Cy Pres Doctrine
Perhaps the most notorious intersection of the law of trusts and the
analytic constructs developed above comes in the form of the cy pres doc-
trine. The doctrine holds that when the goals of a charitable trust become
unattainable, inexpedient, or impracticable, a judge may substitute an-
other charitable object which he believes closely approaches the original
purpose of the trust. At the outset, it is interesting to note that the com-
mon law gives far more latitude for courts to apply cy pres to charitable
trusts than to purely private trusts.
For example, while courts will invoke the cy pres doctrine to change the
beneficiary of a charitable trust a court will never invoke this doctrine to
change the beneficiary of a private trust.9 On the other hand, courts will
permit alterations in private trusts on account of unforeseen circum-
stances. The first part of this section examines the cy pres doctrine in the
context of purely private trusts. The second part examines the doctrine in
the context of charitable trusts.
1. Private Trusts Lacking a Charitable Purpose
The case of Donnelly v. National Bank of Washington10 provides an
example of a court applying common law doctrine to interfere with the
language used by a settlor in the creation of a trust document. In this case,
a trust was created to provide for annual payments for Donnelly, the ben-
eficiary, to attend college and law school. The trust specified that no pay-
ments were to be made after December 31, 1945. In 1942, after having
completed one year of law school, Donnelly was drafted, and was not
discharged until 1946. The court ordered the trustee to resume payments,
despite the fact that such payments were being made after the 1945 dead-
line set by the settlor. The court opined that the settlor's clear intention
was to allow the beneficiary to complete law school, and that the settlor
did not foresee that Donnelly's education would be interrupted by military
• G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 994 (rev. 2d ed.
1983).
10 27 Wash. 2d 622, 179 P.2d 333 (1947).




By no means does the result in this case clearly effectuate the settlor's
intentions. The settlor, had he so intended, easily could have specified that
payments would not be made after 1945, unless events beyond the control
of the beneficiary delayed the completion of law school. Thus, the court's
ruling cannot be justified on the rationale that it economizes on testators'
transaction costs. Similarly, as indicated, there are plausible reasons why
the settlor might not have wanted to subsidize Donnelly's education after
a certain date. Thus, the court's decision does not seem to result in an
economy of error costs to the settlor. As this case does not involve a con-
flict of interest between the beneficiary and the settlor or the settlor and
the trustee, the agency cost rationale is inapplicable.
Another case that makes provision for the payment of money for the
education of the beneficiary seems similarly misguided. In re Estate of
Kerber12 involved the creation of a private trust to provide for the college
education of the settlor's yet unborn grandchildren. One of the settlor's
grandchildren was born with brain damage sufficiently severe to make the
child's chances of attending college slight, particularly if the child did not
receive special education early in life. The court directed the trustee to
pay the trust principal to the child's parents for them to use to provide
special education for the child. The court held that this payment effectu-
ated the settlor's intentions since it increased the chances that the child
ultimately would attend college.IS
Once again, despite the sympathetic facts, it is by no means clear that
the result reached by the court is the one that the settlor would have
reached if he had been around to make the decision for himself. Here the
error costs justification described above comes into play. The court
presumes that the settlor erred in that he did not foresee that he might
have a grandchild who would be unfit to attend college without the benefit
of costly special education. On the other hand, the settlor did not make
any provision for providing payments for the college preparation of any of
his other grandchildren.
Is it reasonable to infer from this that the settlor only wanted to pay for
11 [d. at 628, 179 P.2d at 336.
12 71 Misc. 2d 489,336 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1972).
13 [d. at 490-91, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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the education of his grandchildren if they could gain entrance to college
without preparation?' Of course not. The settlor realized that his
grandchildren, like all children, would need college preparation, which
presumably they would receive from their parents. Normally, the parents,
in the absence of a trust arrangement such as this, would participate in
the payment of the college education of their children. Seen in this light,
the settlor's creation of this trust is not only a gift to the settlor's
grandchildren but to the settlor's children as well. Specifically, the trust
relieved the settlor's children of the financial burden of providing for the
college education of their children. But this benefit was not to be enjoyed
by the parents without cost. Rather, the parents would still be expected to
incur the cost of college preparation as an implied condition of receiving
the benefit of a college education for their children free of charge.
Thus, the court's opinion may have destroyed a quid pro quo, intended
by the settlor, in which the settlor agreed to provide for the college educa-
tion of his grandchildren if and only if the parents of the grandchildren
provided for the college preparation of the grandchildren. Here, at least, it
is arguable that the court's decision raises rather than lowers the transac-
tion costs associated with establishing private trusts because it requires
settlors to specify in great detail the circumstances under which trust
funds can be used for purposes other than those described in the trust
instrument. It seems impossible to know whether the court was right or
wrong in permitting the trust's funds to be used for a purpose other than
the college education of the settlor's grandchildren. Suppose, however, that
so much money was spent on this child's special education needs that in-
sufficient funds were available to satisfy the educational needs of the other
grandchildren. If this were the case, the opinion would seem indefensible
as it would promote the interests of one grandchild (and perhaps one set
of parents) over the others in the absence of any reasoned basis for doing
this.
The point here is not to prove that the court was wrong in these two
cases, only to demonstrate that the evidence does not show that these deci-
sions were right: the courts, by invoking the cy pres doctrine in these
cases, were just as likely to have thwarted the settlor's intentions as to
further them.14 The point becomes even clearer when we see that the law
14 Some states give courts power to amend trusts by statutes, in some instances in very limited
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has created an entirely artificial distinction between the situation in which
a settlor has established an inter vivos trust and the situation in which the
settlor has established an identical trust by writing a will. Courts will,
even after the settlor's death, revise an inter vivos trust in the ways de-
scribed above, but will decline to revise a will under identical circum-
stances.111 Both legal doctrines cannot be efficient in the way Judge Posner
describes.
2. The Charitable Trust
The even greater malleability of the charitable trust is shown by the
famous case of Evans v. Abney.16 Augustus Bacon, a United States Sena-
tor from Georgia, died leaving a will drafted during the segregationist
period of the late 1800s. In this will, Senator Bacon donated a park to the
city of Macon, Georgia but stipulated that the park was to be used only
by white women and children. The City of Macon filed suit to charge that
enforcement of the racial condition violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. In Evans v. Newton,17 the
ways.
California, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2279.1(a) (West 1985), allows a court to change the trustee, termi-
nate the trust, or modify the terms if the fair market value of the principal is so low in relation to the
administrative costs that the purpose of the trust is defeated or substantially impaired.
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2026 (West 1965), allows a court to modify or terminate a
trust if, because of changed circumstances not known to a settlor and not anticipated by him, the
purpose of the trust would be defeated or substantially impaired if the trust were not changed.
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-28 (Burns 1972), allows modification of a trust to the extent of
allowing the settlor to revoke it, when the settlor intended to reserve the power, thought he had, and
the power was omitted by mistake.
Pennsylvania, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7192 (Purdon 1975 & West Supp. 1987), merely allows
a court to combine separate trusts with similar provisions into one, even if created by separate instru-
ments and by separate people.
New York, N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.6 (McKinney 1967), allows a court to make
allowances from the principal for the beneficiary if support is not adequately provided for, if the
court, after notice and hearing, "is satisfied that the original purpose of the creator of the trust cannot
be carried out and that such allowance effectuates the intention of the creator." Note that the court
was acting under this statute in Kerber, 71 Misc. 2d at 490, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 401-02.
lG Brinker v. Wobago Trust Ltd., 610 S.W.2d 160 (Texas Civ. App. 1980). See also Langbein
& Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction of American
Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
18 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
17 382 U.S. 296 (1965).
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United States Supreme Court agreed, holding the condition void.IS
Following the 1965 Supreme Court decision, the heirs of Senator Bacon
sued to have the gift declared void under the theory that the city could no
longer legally run the park in a manner consistent with the testator's
wishes. The heirs won this suit.19 As a result, the property that comprised
the park reverted by operation of law to the heirs20 under the residuary
clause21 of the will.
This decision has been criticized by Judge Posner as inconsistent with
the likely intentions of the settlor:
It appears that Senator Bacon may have inserted the racial condi-
tion primarily to assure that the city would agree to administer the
park. There was no indication that the dominant purpose of the gift
was to foster racial segregation rather than to provide a recreational
facility for the people of Macon. It seems likely that if Senator Ba-
con could be consulted on the matter, he would prefer that the park
remain a park, albeit open to nonwhites, rather than that his distant
heirs subdivide the property for residential or commercial use.22
But Judge Posner's analysis is subject to considerable doubt because it
ignores the fact that Senator Bacon's decision to bequeath the land for a
park instead of for some alternative use was a marginal decision. That is,
a range of alternatives were open to Bacon, and the park decision may
only have prevailed by a narrow increment. Thus, even if the segregation
provision was not "the dominant purpose of the gift," it may have been
enough to cause this particular allocation to edge out the alternative of
bequeathing the land to his heirs.23
18 [d. at 302.
18 Evans, 396 U.S. at 448.
20 [d. at 439.
21 A standard clause which provides for disposition of the testator's property in the event the
conditions of the will turn out to be illegal or impossible to attain.
22 R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 482.
23 Contrary to Judge Posner's assertions, the Court carefully analyzed the nature of the testator's
preferences and concluded that the racial restrictions in the will "were solely the product of the testa-
tor's own full-blown social philosophy." 396 U.S. at 435. Posner's analysis becomes particularly
doubtful when we look at the actual language used by Senator Bacon in his will:
I take occasion to say that in limiting the use and enjoyment of this property to white
people, I am not influenced by any unkindness of feeling or want of consideration for the
Negroes, or colored people.... I am, however, without hesitation in the opinion that in
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Thus, it is by no means clear that the Court reached the wrong result
in Evans. But the question is not, as Judge Posner and the Court put it,
whether maintaining racist restrictions in the park was the testator's pri-
mary intention. Rather, the question is whether the testator would have
preferred the land to be used as a desegregated park more or less than the
alternative available to the Court: allowing the land to revert to Bacon's
existing heirs. At the time of the Court's decision, the Bacon family con-
tained no representatives known to Bacon. In addition, the family had
grown so that dividing the property into a sufficient number of increments
to provide everybody with a share would result in dividing the property
into parcels so small as to be of extremely limited commercial utility.
The only plausible conclusion in light of the available evidence is that
neither of the alternatives available to Senator Bacon would have been
attractive to him. In all likelihood, it would have been a matter of indif-
ference to him whether the land was to be used for an integrated park or
distributed to a bevy of distant relatives. It simply is impossible to know,
in this case, the fact that Bacon declined to specify how his trust should be
used in case the bequest failed seemed to support permitting the City of
Macon to retain the park and run it on a nondiscriminatory basis.24
The more common type of amendment made by the courts is purely
ministerial. For example, when circumstances dictate, courts will change
the directions the trust instrument gives to the trustee regarding how the
trust principal is to be invested, when the original directions become im-
practicable because of changed conditions. Courts deviate from the trust
instrument by conferring additional authority on the trustees.
In Union Commercial Bank v. Kusse,25 the trust instrument directed
the trustee to retain securities, but the court authorized their sale after it
had become imprudent to retain them.26 Such changes are usually al-
lowed, however, only when necessary to keep the purpose of the trust
from being defeated, not merely to benefit the trust. This use of the cy
their social relations the two races ... should be forever separate and that they should not
have pleasure or recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together and in common.
396 U.S. at 442. The Senator's own words thus cast considerable doubt on Posner's supposition that
Senator Bacon would prefer to keep the park open to nonwhites to letting the park revert to his heirs.
•• Evans, 396 U.S. at 445-46.
•• 21 Ohio Misc. 217, 251 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1969).
•• [d. at 223, 251 N.E.2d at 889.
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pres power is also misguided. If the settlor specifies how he wants the
principal invested, it may be his intent that the beneficiary will receive a
certain level of payments only if the investment is able to produce suffi-
cient income to sustain that level of payments. For example, suppose the
trust agreement calls for the principal to be invested in United States gov-
ernment bonds, with the interest to be used to finance the education of the
settlor's grandchildren. It may be the settlor's intention that the grandchil-
dren will receive money for education only if government bonds are able
to produce sufficient income to pay for it. This in turn may be because the
settlor's primary concern is to ensure that the corpus of the trust remains
safely invested so that those interests slated to receive the corpus after the
educational needs of the grandchildren are satisfied are not put at risk.
Thus, for a court to order the principal to be reinvested may frustrate the
settlor's intentions.
Hence, the argument that the cy pres doctrine unambiguously serves the
interests of economic efficiency by reconciling the goals of settlors with
unanticipated future events seems doubtful when examined closely. An
alternative rule which stipulates that the settlor's assets always revert back
to his heirs whenever any significant aspect of the settlor's intentions are
thwarted, unless the settlor provides for a contrary result, would serve the
interests of efficiency at least as well. Such a rule would provide a better
guide to courts on the value to the settlor of his second choice asset
allocation.
B. The Rule Against Perpetuities
Every trust must conform to the Rule Against Perpetuities. The rule
prevents settlors from establishing trusts that contain contingent interests
that vest too remotely in time. A contingent interest such as a contingent
remainder, an executory interest, or a vested remainder subject to open, is
an interest that is either conditional on the occurrence of some specified
event or one where the beneficiaries are unascertainable (for example, a
bequest to all of the children of Joe is contingent if Joe is alive since he
might have more children).
The rule requires that all contingent interests vest, if at all, within
twenty-one years after some life (called the measuring life) that is in being
at the time of the creation of the trust. Trusts that violate the rule are void
at their creation. So for example, a trust to begin making payments to Jon
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Macey's grandchildren when an orchestra is established in Bozeman,
Montana would be void from the outset because it was not certain that the
condition would occur, if at all within twenty-one years after a life in
being. Even if an orchestra were established in Bozeman within twenty-
one years after some life in being at the time of the creation of the trust, it
would not matter because the common law does not permit us to wait and
see whether the contingent interests vest within twenty-one years of a life
in being at the time of the creation of the trust. On the other hand) a trust
to begin payments to Donna Aranson if an orchestra is established within
twenty-one years after Ronald Reagan's death would be valid, because the
trust must vest, if at all, within the time specified by the rule.
The rule contains certain pitfalls relevant to trusts. Perhaps the most
famous of these is the conclusive presumption of lifetime fertility (the
"fertile octogenarian" rule). In determining whether an interest will vest
within twenty-one years after some life in being at the time of the creation
of the trust, the law conclusively assumes that anyone alive is capable of
having children. Even if someone creates a trust for the benefit of the
grandchildren of an eighty-year old woman to vest at the death of the last
surviving child of the eighty-year old woman, the trust is void because the
woman might have another child after the interest is created, in which
case the interest is not certain to vest within twenty-one years of a life in
being at the time of the creation of the interest.
The Rule Against Perpetuities has been praised as efficient because it
limits the ability of people to control assets into the distant future. Such
restrictions on a person's property rights) in turn, are praised as means to
reduce the error costs associated with the creation of a private trust be-
cause, it is argued, "arrangements for the distant future are likely to result
in an inefficient use of resources brought about by unforeseen contingen-
cies."27 This seems to be a peculiar form of paternalism. People forming
trusts clearly will take the possibility of unforeseen contingencies into ac-
count when creating the trust. If the utility to them from making this
allocation of resources is still higher than the next most attractive alterna-
tive) after the possibility of error has been factored into the individual's
utility calculation, then a basic respect for property rights would require
that settlors be able to establish trusts as they see fit.
'7 R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 486.
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Another traditional justification for the Rule Against Perpetuities is
that it increases the possibility of alienation of an interest since it reduces
the amount of time future owners of the interest will be unknown. This
justification does not seem to apply to trusts since the trust principal is
fully alienable by the trustee unless the trust instrument specifies
otherwise.
In fact, in modern times, a strong motivation for making gifts to remote
descendants appears to have been a desire to avoid tax consequences of a
bequest to immediate heirs. Specifically, it long has been a principle of the
law of estate and gift tax that such taxes apply only to transfers of prop-
erty. A life estate that expires on the holder's death, therefore, causes no
additional tax burden on the holder's estate since the property passes to
the next owner without a transfer by the decedent. Thus, a gift of prop-
erty in trust with income to Joe for life and the remainder to Joe's chil-
dren at his death, historically would have allowed Joe to enjoy the prop-
erty without paying taxes on it at his death (the property would be taxed
as a gratuitous transfer to the grantor).28 In 1977 with passage of the
1976 Reform Act entitled "Tax on Certain Generation-Skipping Trans-
fers," a tax is imposed on certain generation-skipping transfers upon the
distribution of property to a generation-skipping heir Uoe's children in
the above example) or upon the termination of an intervening interest in
the trust (such as Joe's life income).29 More recent tax law changes have
complicated the rules immensely, and it now appears that, while the pos-
sibilities to achieve tax avoidance through generation-skipping transfers
have been reduced, they have not been eliminated.
Even the most hearty defender of the tax revenue collection process can-
not defend the Rule Against Perpetuities on the grounds that it protects
the fisc. If there is a tax avoidance problem associated with a particular
transfer, the efficient (and the tax revenue maximizing) solution is to
amend the tax laws to close the loophole rather than to decline to permit
the transfer altogether. Such a solution should be preferred by both the
taxing authority and the property owner.
Despite the fact that the Rule Against Perpetuities is difficult to justify
's Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 161 (1977).
•• See I.R.C. §§ 2601, 2611, 2613 (1987).
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on efficiency grounds, common law courts have done little to mitigate the
effects of the rule on property holders so as to relieve transferors of the
consequences of technical violations. Indeed, most of the significant liber-
alizations of the effects of the rule have come in the form of statutory
enactments.30
If the common law is efficient, it is hard to imagine why the law has
not amended the rule to include a "wait and see" provision in order to
avoid the technical pitfalls of the common law version of the rule. The
"wait and see" rule is a statutory device used to alter the Rule Against
Perpetuities to increase the chances that the settlor's intentions will be
carried out. When a "wait and see" rule is in place, the validity of a
contingent interest is determined on the date the contingency becomes
vested rather than on the date of the creation of the trust. If a trust that
might not vest within some life in being plus twenty-one years winds up
vesting within that period, then the interest is good. So, for example,
under the common law, if an eighty-year old woman establishes a trust
for all of her children, and stipulates that upon the death of the last child
the corpus of the trust is to go to the surviving grandchildren, the interest
would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities because the eighty-year old
woman might have another child after the trust is established. In a juris-
so In addition to the states that have adopted a "wait and see" provision, five other states -
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (West 1981); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(2)
(a) (West 1969); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1978); Maryland, MD. Esr. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103(a) (1979); and Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 1
(West 1987) - determine the validity of a contingent interest upon the expiration of all the life
estates of persons in being when the trust began.
Nine states allow courts by statute to use cy pres powers to amend interests which would be invalid
under the rule: California, CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.5 (West 1982); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 55-111
(1948); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972); Missouri, Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 442.555(2) (Vernon 1986); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Anderson
1976); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 75-78 (West Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania, 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6105 (1986); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975); Washington, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.150 (1987). The Hawaii courts gave themselves this power. See In re
Estate of Chun Qun Yee Hop, 52 Haw. 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970).
An additional seven states allow the courts to reform only to the extent of reducing the age at which
an interest will vest, to bring it within the 21 year limit: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-
96 (WEST 1981); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(4) (West 1969); Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
30, '! 194(c) (1986); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1978); Maryland, MD. Esr. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103(b) (1974); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 184A, § 1
(West 1987); and New York, N.Y. Esr. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1981).
In some states, the right of entry and possibility of reverter terminate after a period of years;
Kentucky has abolished those interests completely.
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diction with a "wait and see" provision31 a court would not declare the
trust invalid, but would wait and see if the woman had any more chil-
dren, and if she did not, declare the interest valid.
Those who argue that the common law is efficient might argue that as
long as we have the Rule Against Perpetuities, strict enforcement best
serves the interests of efficiency because it provides certainty and predict-
ability of title. But such an argument does not account for the fact that the
common law does not permit settlors to contract around the strictures of
the rule by, for example, allowing a property owner to specify that courts
construing the trust document should adopt a wait and see posture to-
wards a particular bequest.
C. Limits on Accumulations
The additional, and perhaps even less understandable, limitations on
the ability of property owners to dispose of their property as they see fit
are the statutory and common law restrictions on the amount of time that
the income generated by a trust may be used to purchase new assets or
increase the value of existing assets rather than be paid out to the benefi-
ciary. While judicial opinions on the subject are scarce, the apparent ma-
jority of opinions holds that accumulations are limited to the time allowed
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Kansas Supreme Court has
held that a trust that directed the trustees to add six-twentieths of the
surplus income to the corpus of the trust each year violates the common
law Rule Against Accumulations,32 and courts in Delaware33 and Con-
necticut34 have reached similar results. In most jurisdictions, if an ac-
cumulation extends for an invalid period of time, the trust assets go to the
estate which would have taken them at the end of the directed
accumulation.35
31 Five states, Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Bobbs-Merrill 1970); Ohio, OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(C) (Page Supp. 1987); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §
6104(b) (1975); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975); and Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 11.98.130 (1987) have adopted a "wait and see" provision.
3. In re Foster's Estate, 190 Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962).
33 Equitable Trust Co. v. Ward, 48 A.2d 519 (Del. Ch. 1946).
.. Gaess v. Gaess, 132 Conn. 96, 42 A.2d 796 (1945).
3. This is called the "next eventual estate." See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 215 (2d ed. 1985); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS
140 (5th ed. 1973). In many states, statutes void only the excessive period of accumulation, which is
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The arguments in favor of a rule limiting accumulations are not per-
suasive. The reasoning seems to be that accumulations are not to be al-
lowed because they allow wealth to be concentrated in the hands of a few
and that the current generation is deprived of the benefits of wealth. It
must be emphasized that these arguments do not support a rule barring
accumulations even if one accepts the dubious premise that these goals
are worth attaining.
Under a modern trust, the beneficiary is not the only one who derives a
benefit. The trustees are required by law to invest the money that com-
prises the corpus of a trust in prudent investments of some kind. As such,
the current generation is in no way deprived of the benefits of the wealth
contained in the trust. Instead, whichever members of the current genera-
tion are the subjects of the investments of the trustees gain the use of the
wealth. In other words, the fact that trust assets are alienable and that
they are invested means that the current generation is not deprived of
their use.
Similarly, unless trustees systematically are able to invest trust accumu-
lations so as to outperform all other investments, there is no reason that
permitting such accumulations will allow wealth to become more concen-
trated. If societal wealth increases at, say, five percent per year, and trust
accumulations on average increase at the same rate per year, then the
beneficiaries of trust accumulations will not control increasingly large
shares of society's wealth.
D. Miscellaneous Other Provisions
Other common law restrictions on the ability of people to dispose of
their property through the creation of a trust relationship abound. One
restriction, except where it has been abolished by statute, is the ancient
Rule in Shelley's Case which restricts settlors from granting a life estate
to one person, and giving the remainder to that person's heirs. Under the
Rule in Shelley's Case, when a transferor attempted such a transfer (such
as 0 to X for life then to X)s heirs and their heirs), the heirs took nothing
and the life tenant took the remainder, despite what courts have rightly
described as the "remarkably clear" intention of the settlor.36
generally defined as the perpetuities period.
S6 Sutton v. Milburn, 289 Ark. 421, 711 S.W.2d 808, 812 (1986) (the court refused to apply the
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A similar common law restriction on alienability is contained in the
Doctrine of Worthier Title. Under this doctrine, if a property owner cre-
ates a life estate, either in himself or someone else, with a remainder in
his own heirs, the grantor receives a reversion and the heirs receive noth-
ing.37 The effect of this is to cause the property to pass to whomever
receives it under the will rather than to the grantor's heirs.
Strange as it may seem, as the following example indicates, an argu-
ment can be made that this rule often serves to effectuate the intention of
testators. Suppose that a property owner, Mr. Anderson, creates a trust
with himself as beneficiary of a life estate and with the principal in re-
mainder to his heirs alive at his death. Without the Doctrine of Worthier
Title, if Mr. Anderson wanted to end the trust during his life, he would
need the consent of all his beneficiaries, making it impossible for him to
get at the principal.38 The Doctrine of Worthier Title remedies this prob-
lem by finding that Mr. Anderson actually intended to create a trust with
a reversion in himself rather than a remainder in his heirs.
On the other hand, to the extent that the initial arrangement made by
the settlor is a form of self-bonding in which the settlor decides to deprive
himself of the opportunity to make future alterations to a gratuitous prop-
erty transfer, the Doctrine of Worthier Title frustrates the settlor's inten-
tions. In general, courts have begun to apply the Doctrine of Worthier
Title as a rule of construction, with the goal of giving effect to the settlor's
intention.39 The doctrine has been abolished by statute in some states and
abolished as a principal of law in others; clear cut applications of the rule
rule to a case involving personal property but noted an inclination to apply the rule in cases involving
real property).
37 Since reversions are inheritable, the effect of the rule is that heirs get the property by descent
(inheriting the land or the reversion) rather than devise (the instrument that gave them the remain-
der), and title by descent is considered "worthier" than title by devise. Of course, where the settlor
makes a subsequent transfer of the property during his life or dies leaving a wiIl with no provision for
his heirs, the Doctrine of Worthier Title has a significant practical effect on the holders of the puta-
tive reversion.
38 Reaching the principal would be impossible because Mr. Anderson could not obtain the con-
sent of his unborn heirs.
39 For example, in Warren Boynton State Bank v. Wallbaum, 143 Ill. App. 3d 628, 493 N.E.2d
21 (1986), the court refused to apply the doctrine because it found that the seller did not use the word
"heirs" in its technical sense, but used it to signify his children. In Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305,
122 N.E. 221 (1919), the court similarly refused to apply the doctrine when doing so appeared to
frustrate the settlor's intentions.




IV. THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND COMMON LAW EFFICIENCY
The efficiency theory of the common law is that "the common law is
best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of
society."4o The common law tends toward efficiency, it is argued, because
an inefficient rule imposes larger costs upon society than an efficient rule,
so there is a greater incentive to litigate such rules than to litigate efficient
rules."l
This Article is not intended to critique the general theory of the com-
mon law's efficiency. Rather, its purpose is to demonstrate that trust rela-
tionships have special characteristics which distinguish the law of trusts
from other facets of the common law. Thus, arguments suggesting that the
common law is generally efficient apply with less force to the law of trusts
than to other facets of the common law.
First, and most obviously, the argument that the common law is effi-
cient presumes that those affected by a particular legal outcome will liti-
gate. This clearly is not the case in a trust relationship. The real party in
interest, the settlor, generally is dead when problems arise, so he is unable
to bring suit directly. While his trustee theoretically champions the set-
tlor's interests, the existence of a trustee does not solve the initial problem
of ascertaining the interests of the settlor. As discussed below, a trustee
has no direct economic interest in seeing that the settlor's trust be used in
one way over another. The trustee's real economic goal is to avoid legal
liability for breaching his fiduciary duty to the beneficiary. This may lead
the trustee to favor the parties most likely to prevail in a suit against the
trustee for breach of his fiduciary duty rather than to favor the party
whom the trustee believes the settlor would have favored.
In addition, settlors are able to observe inefficient legal rules as well as
<0 R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 21. Important articles on the idea that the common law is effi-
cient include Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law, 4 RES. L. & EcON. 1 (1982);
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 ]. LEG. STUD. 65 (1977);
Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 ]. LEG. STUD. 51 (1977).
<1 R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 21. For a compelling critique of the literature on the efficiency of
the common law, see Aranson, Economic Efficiency and the Common Law: A Critical Survey, in LAW
AND EcoNOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGULATION (International Studies in Economics
and Econometrics no. 13) (Kluwer 1986).
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efficient ones, and can craft their trusts so as to avoid potential problems.
As such, the only trusts that become the subject of litigation are those that
have been artlessly crafted by lawyers. Rather than tending towards effi-
ciency, then, common law judges inevitably seem destined to be faced with
a set of alternatives, none of which seem clearly to further the settlor's
intentions. In other words, over time courts reexamine rules relating to
trusts because they are unartfully created, not because they are inefficient.
The final reason why the common law of trusts does not appear to tend
towards efficiency stems from the basic observation that preferences vary.
A judicial decision in one case to uphold a trust may accord with the
preferences of the settlor in that case, while the same decision in an identi-
cal case would not be in accord with the preferences of another settlor.
Rules such as those described above that tinker with settlors' intentions
are likely to thwart the wishes of at least some testators.
Thus, the argument that Judge Posner makes in support of the cy pres
doctrine seems very weak. Settlors have no way to avoid the risk that
courts might invoke their cy pres power to alter their expectations, and
consequently the possibility always exists that their intentions will be
thwarted. But if there were no such doctrine, then settlors would know
that if conditions change so as to make their trust impracticable, then the
trust would fail. This would encourage settlors to specify how they wish
their funds to be allocated in case it becomes impossible to fulfill their
initial request.
From a public choice perspective, it is interesting to note that the cy
pres doctrine applies only to charitable trusts. Courts do not rewrite trusts
that are not for charitable purposes. Thus, the cy pres power appears to
be a device for permitting judges, through a finding that the settlor had a
"general charitable purpose" when he created the trust, to keep private
funds in the public domain, even when the settlor's intent might have been
to have the assets revert back to the settlor's estate. The special interest
beneficiaries of the trust have a clear incentive to press for alterations in
the trust that would allow them to retain control over the trust's assets,
even after the settlor's original intentions have been frustrated. Repeated
litigation, particularly in the absence of opponents with any natural allies
on the bench, would lead not to an efficient outcome, but to the cy pres
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doctrine, which seems highly inefficient.42
V. PRIVATE TRUSTS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
Trusts, particularly charitable trusts, often exhibit characteristics iden-
tical to the separation of ownership and management that characterizes
the modern, publicly held corporation. In a public corporation, principals
(the shareholders) purchase an ownership interest in a firm that they fully
expect to be managed by their agents (the officers and directors). As in
any agency relationship, problems arise due to the inherent conflict of in-
terest between the agents and the principals. Agents have incentives to
shirk and to divert the resources of the firm toward their own ends, while
the principals, due to collective action and free rider problems, often find'
it costly to curtail such conduct. The costs to the firm of diversion by
managers from the interests of shareholders, together with the costs of
avoiding such conduct are called agency costs. The subject of corporate
finance is largely made up of a study of the contractual devices and mar-
ket mechanisms that serve to align the interests of managers and share-
holders in order to reduce the costs to firms of the agency relationship.
Seen in this way, the agency cost problem facing the charitable trust
appears to be much greater than the agency cost problem facing the public
corporation. Competition in capital markets, product markets, and the
market for corporate control all induce managers and directors of public
corporations to act in ways consonant with shareholder welfare. By con-
trast, none of these incentive systems serve to prompt foundation trustees
to serve the welfare of beneficiaries. Along these lines, Terry Anderson
has argued that monitoring a trust relation is more difficult than monitor-
ing a public corporation because the objectives of the trust are not as
clearly specified as those of the corporation.43 Specifically, the public cor-
poration clearly exists as a contractually created legal entity whose pur-
•• See generally Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 205, 211 (t982)
(observing that if the determining factor in the outcome of litigation is the interest group involved,
litigation will only result in efficiency if each party to the litigation represents the entire range of
social interests involved in the dispute).
• 3 T. Anderson, The Economics of Trusts 3 (December 1987) (unpublished manuscript)
("[M)easurement and monitoring costs are often higher with the trust relationship because it is more
difficult to specify what the objective function is. In the absence of profits as the ultimate measure of
performance, measurement and monitoring costs rise thus affording the trustee with more potential
for opportunistic behavior.").
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pose is to maximize profits. But, as noted above, the objectives of the trust
vary with the individual preferences of the settlor. As a consequence, it
appears to be more difficult to develop standardized, default legal rules to
lower transactions and error costs for trusts than it is for the general
corporation.
These problems have led to an enormous degree of skepticism about the
efficacy of the trust relationship. Judge Posner, for example, argues in
favor of a rule requiring charitable foundations to distribute every gift
received - original endowment and accrued interest - within a specified
number of years in order to force the foundation to seek new gifts from
time to time in order to continue its existence. His argument is that,
"[s]ince donors are unlikely to give money to an enterprise known to be
slack, the necessity for returning periodically to the market for charitable
donations would give trustees and managers of charitable foundations an
incentive they now lack to conduct a tight operation."""
Of course, such a rule is per se inefficient. Since donors are at present
completely free to specify a fixed term for the life of their trust if they
choose to do so, this rule invariably would violate the intentions of the
donors. Presumably, donors are aware of the possibilities for shirking by
trustees when they establish the trust relation in the first place. Rational
settlors will discount the expected benefits to them from the establishment
of the trust by the probability that shirking by the trustees will reduce or
completely thwart their intentions.
The literature on the economics of the trust relationship recognizes only
two sources of constraint on agency misbehavior (which might also be de-
scribed as trustee opportunism). The first is the legal standard of fiduciary
duties facing trustees. The second is the reputational capital of "repeat
player" trustees such as bank trust departments, which provides such enti-
ties with incentives to maximize trust value in order to attract new busi-
ness based on prior performance.
It seems that the comparisons between publicly held corporations and
trusts significantly exaggerate the problems inherent in the private trust
relationship. There are three reasons for this. First, the comparisons fail
to recognize that the objective function of the modern trust is in fact far
•• R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 484.
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simpler than the objective function for the publicly held firm. As a conse-
quence, there is less need for market discipline of ordinary trustee busi-
ness decisions than for market discipline of ordinary officer/director busi-
ness decisions. Second, the residual claimants of a private trust often are a
small group of easily identified people who have strong economic incen-
tives to monitor the activities of the trustee. Finally, because the optimal
strategy for attaining the objectives of a private trust are frequently de-
fined with reference to universally understood terms, the sense of individ-
ual responsibility of the trustee is much more clearly defined, and commu-
nity based public monitoring is likely to be effective for a private trust
where it is not for the public corporation.
A. The Simplicity of the Objective Function
As demonstrated above, purely private trusts often are established to
provide a particular person with a fixed source of income, an education, a
house, or some other easily indentified object. It is significantly easier to
discern whether a trustee has reached these sorts of objectives than it is to
determine whether the officers and directors of a publicly held corporation
are doing everything within their power to maximize firm profits.
,
Where the needs of a trust's beneficiaries are clearly identified, the only
difficulty associated with the trustee's duties involves investing the trust's
assets so as to ensure a stream of income sufficient to meet these needs. As
Langbein and Posner have pointed out, the trustee's investment decision
involves two steps: evaluating specific assets and combining these assets to
form a portfolio.4 !>
Modern portfolio theory has reduced these investment decisions to a
science. For instance, the Capital Asset Pricing Model posits a linear rela-
tionship between the risk and return of an investment portfolio. The mar-
ket, in other words, induces investors to assume higher degrees of risk
only by offering them higher rates of return. Simply put, investors are
compensated for bearing increasing levels of risk. But not all investor risk
is compensated. Rivalrous competition among investors eliminates any
compensation to investors for any risk associated with a particular stock
that the investors can avoid at low cost through diversification. And be-
•• Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
1, 6 (1976).
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cause it is possible to construct an investment portfolio whose components
are negatively correlated (as well as uncorrelated), it is possible to con-
struct a portfolio that virtually eliminates the risks associated with any
particular firm whose stock is represented in the portfolio. In a portfolio
that is diversified in this manner, if a particular stock does poorly another
stock in the portfolio can be expected to perform well, thereby offsetting
the poor performance of the first stock.
These insights about different sorts of risk have led to the classification
of risk into two categories - systematic risk and unsystematic risk. The
unsystematic (or firm specific) risk associated with a particular security
can be eliminated by mixing the security with other securities in a diversi-
fied portfolio. Systematic risk (or risk associated with general market fluc-
tuations) cannot be eliminated by diversification. Investors are only com-
pensated for this latter type of risk.46
Thus, it can be noted that financial economics enable us to specify with
some degree of completeness a trustee's objective function over a fund of
money left to his stewardship.4'1 His duty is simply to obtain the market
rate of return on the investment, which is done by: (1) creating a diversi-
fied portfolio of financial assets that eliminates non-systematic risk; and
(2) selecting a portfolio with the appropriate risk/return tradeoff to en-
sure that the beneficiary will be provided for. It is not difficult to deter-
mine whether the trustee is fulfilling this duty.
In fact, the requirements of the law are even less demanding than de-
scribed above. While there is a general duty to make trust assets "produc-
tive,"48 as well as a requirement that trustees make investments with the
same degree of care as would a "prudent person in the care of his or her
own assets,"49 courts and legislatures have been slow to adopt the
Langbein and Posner suggestion of imposing a general duty to diversify,
although the trend appears to be in that direction. Some jurisdictions rec-
•• R. BRULEY, AN INTRODUcnON TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS, 42-46, 48-
54, 115-31 (1969).
•, J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 171-227
(1973).
•• MENNELL, WILLS AND TRUSTS IN A NUTSHELL 298 (1979).
•• Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830) (the duty of a trustee is to
"observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as
well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested").
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ognize the duty to diversify as a separate, distinct duty of the trustee; and
others recognize it as a factor in determining whether the trustee has com-
plied with the prudent person rule, although the definition such courts
give to the term "diversification" is not yet particularly rigorous:5o But it
remains that the chore of specifying the details of an objective function for
the trustees of purely private trusts seems significantly easier than the
chore of specifying such details for the officers and directors of public
corporations.
B. The Nature of Private Trust Beneficiaries
Often the trustee of a purely private trust has a duty of "preserving real
or personal property in its present form and delivering title or possession
upon the happening of some event, e.g. attaining age twenty-one or the
payment of a debt."151 In such cases, not only is the objective function of
the trustee exceedingly easy to discover, there is a clear residual claimant
with strong incentives to monitor the trustee's performance. Problems
arise only when the object of the trust is not clearly identified. For exam-
ple, trusts established to fund "scientific research" or to "reduce poverty
in Appalachia" are more difficult to monitor and to evaluate than a trust
to provide for the college education of a specified individual. But, as ex-
plained in the following section, in the latter class of cases, the individual
trustee is likely to feel a heightened sense of individual responsibility that
provides an additional incentive to faithfully administer the provisions of
the trust.
Moreover, there is no danger due to lack of monitoring in the realm of
purely private trusts due to the well-established requirement that such
trusts cannot have "indefinite beneficiaries." This requirement, which
does not apply to charitable trusts, ensures that there always will be a
well-defined beneficiary to monitor the behavior of the trustees.
O. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 45, at 3-6 (describing the slow evolution of the law
defining trustees' duties).
OJ MENNELL, supra note 48, at 298.
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C. Public Expectations
Individuals develop reputational capital not only as experts in particu-
lar specialties (such as economists and lawyers), but also for general per-
sonal qualities such as honesty and scrupulousness. The value of a reputa-
tion for honesty cannot be overestimated. In addition, where a trust
specifies that it is to be used for some general purpose such as the funding
of scientific research or the elimination of poverty, there is in place a com-
munity of scientists and social workers with very clearly defined ideas and
expectations regarding the appropriate bounds of proper conduct. Thus
while there may be no clearly defined or identifiable set of beneficiaries
for trusts of this kind, there is an (admittedly loose) set of standards for
judging the performance of the trustees of such trusts.
This set of standards, which might be called community standards, is
bolstered by the fact that trustees who stray markedly from adherence to
such standards are likely to face precipitous drops in the value of their
own reputations within the relevant communities. This fear of loss of
reputational capital is particularly acute where, as generally occurs, the
trustees are drawn from the communities directly affected by the trust.
Thus by choosing trustees whose personal reputation is at stake, benefi-
ciaries can obtain some assurance that the trusts they create for the provi-
sion of public goods will be administered faithfully.
Note that, while this argument seems valid with respect to private
trusts with private trustees, it does not apply to governmental trusts ad-
ministered by bureaucrats responding to vastly different institutional pres-
sures than those described above. Such officials, whose goal it is to ad-
vance within the government bureaucracy, are likely to be far less
sensitive to community pressures, and are unlikely to have amassed signif-
icant reputational capital within the relevant community in the first place.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has made three distinct points. First, it has examined the
restrictions that the legal system places on settlors' use of their property.
The goals of the legal system should be to establish rules that reduce the
incidence of transaction costs, error costs, and agency costs associated with
the creation of a trust. In reality, the legal restrictions do not appear to
reduce such costs and thus seem inconsistent with existing arguments re-
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garding the general efficiency of the common law.
Second, this Article has argued that individual investors who establish
private trusts make rational dispositions of their property, and these dis-
positions do not result in systematic inefficiencies. It is exceedingly rare
for settlors to restrict the way in which their investments are allocated,
and where the trustees can invest freely, there is no distortion of the mar-
ket processes that cause assets to flow to their highest valued users. Thus,
there appears to be no basis for the argument that there is a conflict be-
tween respect for the rights of the settlor to enter into contracts for the
disposition of his property and the goal of assuring that property rights
are allocated efficiently.
Finally, the Article has looked at the private trust from the perspective
of the modern theory of the firm. It has been observed that, while the
constraints facing officers and directors of public corporations differ from
the constraints facing the trustees of private trusts, the differences can be
explained with reference to the differences between private trusts and
public corporations. For one thing, the absence of profits as the ultimate
measure of performance is not an insurmountable burden. Modern portfo-
lio theory, the reputational capital of trustees, and the simplicity of most
settlors' wishes ensures that trust assets generally are allocated in ways
consistent with the intentions of their creators.
Thus the oft-made argument that, from an efficiency standpoint, private
trusts are nothing but a retarded variety of public corporations due to the
lack of market constraints on trustee misbehavior, appears unfounded.
Where, as in the case of Judge Posner, the complaint is coupled with a
plea for increased regulation of the trust relation, the charge is particu-
larly dangerous. As in other areas, the public interest is best served by a
legal system that respects the integrity of individual choice and privately
arranged contractual obligation.
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